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Childs and Klahn: Environmental Audits in Wyoming: A Practitioner's Guide

ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS IN WYOMING:
A Practitioner's Guide'
INTRODUCTION

A client comes to your office seeking advice. His company is trying
to decide whether to perform an environmental audit.2 The company's
environmental compliance manager wants to evaluate the company's
facilities for compliance with applicable state and federal environmental
regulations. She is concerned that the company's past andlor present
operating practices might be putting the company at risk of violating environmental laws. She argues that only a comprehensive audit of all the
company's facilities can give it the information necessary to evaluate this
potential risk and take action to eliminate it, if necessary. She has reminded her company of the size of potential fines that can be assessed by regulatory agencies for regulatory noncompliance.
However, other corporate managers are concerned that conducting
such an audit might be the equivalent of opening Pandora's box. As the
situation currently stands, they know of no environmental problems at any
of the company's facilities. Conducting an audit could lead to the State or
others obtaining a comprehensive summary of the company's environmental problems on a silver platter. As these managers see it, the benefits
the company might realize from conducting an audit are outweighed by
the possibility that regulatory agencies might use the company's own audit

1. The authors extend their sincere thanks to: Nancy Freudenthal, Davis & Cannon (for
suggesting this Comment); Mary Throne, Wyoming Attrmey General's Office (for reviewing our

work); and especially Kate Fox, Davis & Cannon (for providing invaluable suggestions, advice, and
editorial comments).
2. An "environmental audit" is a:
voluntary, internal and comprehensive evaluation of one (1) or more facilities or an activity at one (1) or more facilities regulated under this [Wyoming Environmental Quality]
Act, or of management systems related to the facility or activity, that is designed to identify and prevent noncompliance and to improve compliance with this act.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a)(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
The statute also provides that "fo]nce initiated the voluntary environmental audit shall be
completed within one hundred eighty (180) days. Nothing in this section shall be construed to autho-

rize uninterrupted voluntary environmental audits," Id.
See also Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,006 (1986) (defining environmental audit as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements") [hereinafter Auditing Policy]; EPA Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875, 16,877 (1995) [hereinafter Interim Policy] (adopting the 1986 definition of audit) .
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against the company and assess fines for regulatory noncompliance based
on information from the audit. Why go looking for trouble, they argue,
when it is the State's job to protect the environment?
Your client has come to you because he recalls that Wyoming recently enacted "some kind of protection for companies that do their own
environmental audits." He wants to know more about Wyoming's environmental audit law and how it might help his company. However, he is
also concerned about the implications of having conducted an audit if the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ever inspects his facilities because he is uncertain of the EPA's policy regarding audits.
This comment will provide direction to Wyoming attorneys whose
clients seek advice about an environmental audit. We first focus on the
specifics of the Wyoming environmental audit law. We next consider the
potential for federal preemption of Wyoming's law and how that could
affect clients. Given the possibility of federal preemption, we then examine the EPA's environmental audit policy. Finally, we offer possible
changes to Wyoming's environmental audit law that could benefit both the
regulated industry and Wyoming's Department of Environmental Quality.
BACKGROUND

History and Context of Wyoming's Environmental Audit Law
In 1995, the Wyoming Legislature joined a growing number of
states3 passing environmental audit laws. As originally introduced, the
audit legislation would have provided both an evidentiary privilege and
immunity from civil penalties for environmental violations discovered
during audits.' Environmental and citizens' groups were concerned that
regulated industries would receive a complete evidentiary privilege for

3. For states providing an evidentiary privilege only see: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to 312 (Michie 1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-3-1 to 12 (Michie 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1995).
For states providing both an evidentiary privilege and a penalty immunity see: COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-25-126.5 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to -811 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 603332 to 3339 (Michie 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-010 (1995); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 324.14801 to -. 14810 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 114C.20 to -.31 (West 1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lD-125 to -133 (West 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS H8 1-40-33 to -37 (Michie
1996) (immunity only); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7101 to -109 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to 1199 (Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 3511-1 105 to 1106 (Michie Supp. 1996).
4. Deirdre Stoelzle, Environmental Groups Gear Up for Legislature, CASPER STAR-TRIB.,
Jan. 7, 1995, at Al; Joan Barron, Pollution AuditDebate Looms, CASPER STAR-TRan., Jan. 21, 1995,
at Al.
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their audits and escape fines from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ).' However, the legislation as enacted only provides
limited evidentiary privileges6 and immunities7 from civil fines for regulated entities conducting environmental audits. 8
Governor Geringer directed the DEQ to prepare an annual report on use
of the self-audit provisions by industry.9 The first such report was filed by the
DEQ in January of 1997.10 As of December, 1996, the DEQ reported no use
of the audit provisions by regulated entities in Wyoming." However, three
regulated entities had sought the advice of the DEQ regarding audit-related
issues. One reported a violation for which the DEQ normally does not assess
penalties; another sought technical assistance and was not seeking either the
waiver of immunity or the privilege (the DEQ provided the assistance); and
the third submitted a description of problems identified in the audit but did not
submit the entire audit document and was ineligible for penalty protection.' 2
The DEQ, puzzled by the low participation rate, developed a questionnaire to assess regulated parties' reasons for declining to use the audit
provisions. 3 Only 21 % of the responding parties (200 questionnaires/78
returned) were aware of the audit provision prior to receipt of the DEQ's
questionnaire.' 4 However, 90% of respondents indicated an interest in
learning more about the self-audit process and 68% of them reported
planning to conduct a self-audit in the coming year.m" The results of the
survey indicate a likely growth in use of the audit provisions.

5. See, e.g., Letters to the Editor, CASPER STAR-TRiI., Jan. 26, 1995, at A9; Joan Barron
Bill on Environmental Self-Audits Wins Approval, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Jan. 27, 1995, at BI; Letters
to the Editor, CASPER STAR-T~m., Jan. 31, 1995, at A7; Letters to the Editor, CASPER STAR-TRIB.,
Feb. 2, 1995, at A7; Encourage Environmental Compliance, Offer Companies Help, Not Web of

Secrecy, CASPER STAR-TRm., Feb. 12, 1995, at A4.
6. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
8. Joan Barron, Geringer Signs Environmental Self-Audit Bill, CASPER STAR-TRiB., Feb. 21,
1995, at Al.

9. Id.
10. Dennis Hemmer, Memorandum to Joint Minerals, Business and Economic Development
Interim Committee (Jan. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum] (on file with the Land and Water Law
Review).
11. Id. See also Joan Barton, Self-Audit Waivers Haven't Been Used. Debate Continues Over
Law's Impact, CASPER STAR-Tm., Sept. 22, 1996, at Al (providing both environmental and industry
perspectives on the lack of use of the audit provisions).
12. Memorandum, supra note 10, at 1. Note that the regulated entity that submitted a portion
of the audit likely has retained its privilege with regard to the entire audit. See WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11-1105 (Michie Supp. 1996).
13. Memorandum, supra note 10, attachs. (Environmental Audit Questionaire, Environmental
Self-Audit Questionaire Results).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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The DEQ has also announced a related rulemaking that will create
an incentive for small businesses" to voluntarily disclose incidents of
environmental noncompliance.' 7 The rule's purpose is to encourage regulated entities to scrutinize their operations and approach the DEQ for
assistance upon discovery of a violation." Under the proposed regulations, small businesses can obtain a penalty waiver for voluntarily reporting violations or discovery of violations through requests for compliance
assistance or compliance assistance seminars, provided they take corrective action after discovering violations. 19 The proposed rule thus distinguishes between the mere reporting of an incident of noncompliance and
the reporting of an incident of noncompliance within the context of an
audit.' A penalty waiver for small businesses will be unavailable in certain circumstances. 2 This proposed rule should encourage small businesses, who might not be able to conduct a full audit, to at least examine
their operations for environmental compliance.
Wyoming's Approach To EnvironmentalAudits
Wyoming's environmental audit provisions are codified at sections
35-11-1105 and 35-11-1106 of the Wyoming Statutes. Section 35-11-1105
provides definitions and establishes an evidentiary privilege for information obtained through an environmental audit.' Section 35-11-1106 provides limited immunity from civil penalties or injunctive relief.'
A. Section 35-11-1105: Environmental Audit Privilege
The limited evidentiary privilege is a cornerstone of Wyoming's
environmental audit law.2' This privilege protects an environmental audit

16. The proposed rule defines small business as a regulated entity with 100 or fewer employees in all of its facilities or operations. Small Business Voluntary Disclosure Incentive § 2(a) (pro-

posed) (on file with the Land and Water Law Review) [hereinafter Small Business].
17. Joan Barron, DEQ Drafts Self-Audit Policy For Small Businesses, CASPER Star-Trib., Oct.
6, 1996, at B1.
18. Small Business, supra note 16, § 1.

19. Id. § 3(a),(b).
20. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying notes 10002 (describing the EPA's penalty reduction policy available to entities reporting violations outside of
the context of an audit).
21. Small Business, supra note 16, §§ 4(a)(i)-(x).
22. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.

23. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
24, The statutory evidentiary privilege established by WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(b) was
"created to protect the confidentiality of communications relating" to voluntary environmental audits
regulated entities may conduct to "assess and improve compliance with the [Wyoming Environmental
Quality] [Aict." Id.
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report' from admission as "evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding." 2I The "party asserting the privilege... has the burden
of proving the privilege. "I The party seeking the privilege may waive it
either by failing to assert it or introducing "any part of an environmental
audit report as evidence in any proceeding, including reporting of violations under W.S. 35-11-1106(a)." 2" This means that the privilege and the
immunity provisions provided under Wyoming Statutes are mutually
exclusive. 29
This section does provide for disclosure of information from the
audit in certain situations. After an in camera review,30 a civil court or a

25. An "environmental audit report" is defined as:
[A] set of documents, each labeled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document,"
prepared as a result of an environmental audit and may include field notes and records of
observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, drawings,
photographs, computer-generated or electronically recorded information, maps, charts,
graphs and surveys if supporting information is generated or developed for the primary
purpose and in the course of an environmental audit. An environmental audit report, when
completed, shall have three (3) components:
(A) An audit report prepared by the auditor, including the scope, commencment
[sic] and completion dates of the audit, the information gained in the audit, conclusions and recommendations, together with exhibits and appendices;
(B) Memoranda and documents analyzing the audit report and discussing implementation issues; and
(C) An audit implementation plan that corrects past noncompliance, improves current compliance and prevents future noncompliance.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1996).
26. Id. § 1105(c). The privilege expressly does not extend to:
(i) Documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be collected, developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to a regulatory agency
pursuant to any regulatory requirement of this act or any other federal or state law or
regulation;
(ii) Information obtained by observation, sampling or monitoring by any regulatory agency;
(iii) Information obtained from a source independent of the environmental audit;
(iv) Documents existing prior to the commencement of the environmental audit; or
(v) Documents prepared subsequent to and independent of the completion of the environmental audit.
Id. § 1105(d).
27. Id. § 1105(c)(iv).
28. Id. § 1105(c)(i).
29. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing clients' possible courses of action
in recognition of this mutual exclusivity).
30. For purposes of the audit provisions, "in camera review" is defined as "a hearing or review in a courtroom, hearing room or chambers to which the general public is not admitted." WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a)(iii) (Michie Supp. 1996). This section further provides that "[a]fter such
hearing or review, the content of oral and other evidence and statements of the judge and counsel
shall be held in confidence by those participating in or present at the hearing or review, and any
transcript of the hearing or review shall be sealed and not considered a public record until its contents
are disclosed, pursuant to this section, by a court having jursidiction over the matter." Id.
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hearing officer in an administrative proceeding may require disclosure of
all or part 3' of the report if the court or hearing officer determines that:
(A) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose;
(B) the material is not subject to the privilege;
(C) material shows evidence of noncompliance with this act or
any federal environmental law or regulation and appropriate
efforts to achieve compliance were not initiated as promptly as
circumstances permit and pursued with reasonable diligence; or
(D) the information contained in the report demonstrates a substantial threat to the public health or environment or damage to
real property or tangible personal property in areas outside of the
facility property. 2
In a criminal proceeding, different procedures exist for asserting the
privilege. The prosecuting attorney can obtain the audit report with probable cause, but must place it under seal. 3' The privilege is waived if the
person seeking to protect the audit report does not file with the court a
petition requesting an in camera hearing within twenty days.' The prosecuting attorney may then review the privileged material after a judge
issues an order scheduling the in camera review hearing.
B. Section 35-11-1106: Limited Immunity
The other cornerstone of Wyoming's environmental audit law is the
limited immunity available under certain circumstances. Operators who
voluntarily disclose violations discovered through an audit within sixty
days of its completion may avoid civil penalties or injunctions. 36 However, this immunity is limited in several ways. If reporting the violation is
required under federal, state, local ordinance or court order, the immunity
does not exist because the reporting is considered mandatory.' Additionally, the immunity is not available if a court finds a pattern of serious
violations within a three year time period.3" Finally, the immunity may
also be lost if any one of the following conditions is met:

31. See Id. § 1105(c)(ix) (providing for disclosure of "those portions of an environmental audit
report relevant to issues in dispute in the proceeding").
32. Id. § 1105(c)(ii).
33. Id. § I105(c)(v).
34. Id. § 1105(c)(vi).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 1106(a).
37. Id. § 1106(b).
38. Id.§ 1106(d).
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(i) The facility is under investigation for any violation of this act
at the time the violation is reported;
(ii) The owner or operator does not take action to eliminate the
violation within the time frame specified in an order affirmed by
the council or otherwise made final pursuant to W.S. 35-11701(c)(ii);
(iii) The violation is the result of gross negligence or recklessness; or
(iv) The department has assumed primacy over a federally delegated environmental law and a waiver of penalty authority would
result in a state program less stringent than the federal program or
the waiver would violate any federal rule or regulation required to
maintain state primacy. If a federally delegated program requires
the imposition of a penalty for a violation, the voluntary disclosure of the violation shall to the extent allowed under federal law
or regulation, be considered a mitigating factor in determining the
penalty amount. 9
Other factors potentially affecting the client's ability to assert the
privilege and immunities include; the client's environmental history,
possible preemption by federal law, and the State's primacy over environmental programs.
C. Importance of Client's Environmental History
For purposes of applying Wyoming's environmental audit law,
clients can be divided into two general categories. The first group includes companies with clean environmental records. The second group of
clients are those with poor environmental records. The protections available to a client under the environmental audit provisions depend on which
group the client is in.
Accordingly, attorneys will want to consult with their client about its
environmental record. "Clean" clients likely will be eligible for the penalty immunities under the audit provisions.' However, clients with more
complicated environmental records may not be eligible for the penalty
immunities. 4 A record showing violations that arose from the use of a
particular water treatment system, for instance, may not be problematic if

39. Id. § 1106(a)(i-iv). See also infra text accompanying notes 75-105 (regarding the EPA's
response to audit laws in states with primacy over federal environmental laws).
40. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
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the client is now, more than three years later, experiencing air quality
violations.42 However, any record of serious violations that a court might
construe as a "pattern of continuous or repeated violations of environmental laws ...

that were due to separate and distinct events giving rise to

the violations, within the three (3) year period prior to the date of disclosure" may indicate that a client might not benefit from the audit provisions.43 Accordingly, properly characterizing a client's environmental
record before advising him to proceed with an environmental audit is
important.

A client with no history of environmental violations has few reasons
not to pursue an environmental audit. The audit provision encourages a
"clean" client to report if it discovers a serious violation" that includes
effects beyond its property line or presents a substantial threat to the
public health or environment. 4' The client cannot assert a privilege in
such a situation since the privilege does not extend to audit report results
that demonstrate such a violation.' However, the client will likely still be
eligible for immunity from civil penalties.'
Cleaning up a violation of this type likely will be costly to the client.
However, by reporting the violation to the DEQ at the time of discovery,
the client may avoid civil penalties and may also have an opportunity to
take proactive steps to remediate some of the environmental damage
beyond its property. In addition, the client who has disclosed the violation
(and possibly has begun remediation) is arguably in a better bargaining
position if plaintiffs begin filing civil lawsuits. Finally, the incentive to
report encourages companies to be good corporate citizens.
If, however, the violation is one which is easily corrected, a "clean"
client may not wish to use the immunity but rather use the privilege. By
applying for immunity, the client will lose the privilege; the audit then
becomes discoverable and the client is open to civil suit for the violation.
Relying on the privilege might be more prudent for such a client since the
possibililty of civil action is reduced. Additionally, if an enforcement
agency conducts an inspection and the violation has been cleaned up, the

42. Wyo. STAT. ANN.

§ 35-11-1106(d)

(Michie Supp. 1996).

43. Id.
44. The Wyoming statute (consistent with all other states' environmental audit provisions)
provides no definition of "serious violation."
45. The Wyoming statute (consistent with all other states' environmental audit provisions)
provides no definition of "substantial threat to the public health or environment."
46. Id. § ll05(c)(ii)(D).
47. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Note that the immunity may not apply if
DEQ's waiver of the penalty would jeopardize the state's federally delegated authority under any
federal environmental law. Id.
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investigator will either have no questions (if the remediation is not obvious) or will have to overcome the client's privilege to learn about the
violation." If projected remediation costs are less than or equal to the
possible penalty, the client might see it as an advantage to simply clean
up the violation and avoid disclosure.
While the audit privilege provision seems to encourage immediate
remediation of a "clean" client's minor violations, this course is not
without risk. For instance, if remediation becomes more complicated than
the client first imagined, the wisest route may be to report the violation
prior to the sixty day deadline, receive the penalty immunity, and continue the remediation. The stakes are too high to be caught in the middle of
remediating an unreported violation.
Clients with a history of environmental violations should be more
cautious about conducting environmental audits, since the penalty immunity might not be available to them. However, as the EPA targets its investigations on facilities with poor environmental compliance records, a company is not likely to avoid civil penalties in any event.' In addition, by
learning of violations through an audit, the company has the opportunity
to begin remediation and possibly save money that might otherwise be
spent in years of litigation.
Clients with poor environmental compliance histories are not constrained from asserting the privilege for their audit results. Such clients
have no incentives to report the violation, as penalty immunity is unlikely, so they will not automatically waive the privilege.' If the company
takes prompt action to clean up the violation, the audit privilege may
hold, even if challenged by the EPA, the DEQ, or a citizen's group. The
burden of proof is on the company to provide evidence that the appropriate efforts to clean up the violation were promptly made and that clean up
has been pursued with due diligence. 5'
The privilege does not extend to any violations that are demonstrated
to be a substantial threat to public health or the environment or that
threaten damage to real or tangible personal property outside the

48. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
49. Auditing Policy, supra note 2, at 25,007. See also Restatement of Policies, 59 Fed. Reg.
38,455, 38,458 (1994) (adopting the 1986 enforcement policy) [hereinafter Restatement]; Incentives
for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,707, 66,712 (1995) (establishing the applicability of the final
policy statement "to the extent existing EPA enforcement policies are not inconsistent") [hereinafter
Incentives].
50. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
51. Id. § 1105(c)(ii)(C).
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company's property." A serious violation of this sort should be reported
immediately to the DEQ, although no penalty immunity will be available
to a bad actor and no privilege can be asserted. Companies, particularly
those with a history of compliance violations, are at a disadvantage if
serious violations they learned of through an audit are also discovered by
an enforcement agency.
D. Federal Preemption of State Audit Laws
In advising a client whether to conduct an audit, a practitioner should
consider the possibility of federal law preempting Wyoming's audit law. As in
all legislative realms occupied by both states and the federal government, state
audit laws can be subject to federal preemption 3 because of the evidentiary
privilege which conflicts with the purpose of most federal environmental
statutes. The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 501, reflect the federal courts'
general rejection of state-created statutory and common law privileges in
federal civil cases brought under a federal statute.'

52. Id. § 1105(c)(ii)(D).
53. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (holding New Mexico's law allowing
the round-up, removal and sale of bunos from federal public land under the New Mexico Estuary Law was
in direct conflict with the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1994)).
Congress has the power to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983). Federal law may preempt state law expressly. Id. (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). Federal law may also preempt state law if
Congress' intent may be found from a "scheme of federal regulations pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it." Id. (internal quotations marks omitted)
(quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). Neither of
these types of preemption apply to state environmental audit laws. Although Congress has considered
federal environmental audit legislation, none has been enacted into law. However, a third type of
preemption may apply with regard to audit laws. Audit laws creating statutory privileges may be
preempted to the extent that state audit laws actually conflict with federal law. "Such a conflict arises
when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." Id.
State environmental audit laws that contain either privilege or immunity from penalty provisions may substantially conflict with the purpose of federal environmental laws. See infra notes 5470 and accompanying text.
54. The Supreme Court, for example, has said, "[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are
in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). See generally FED. R. EVID. 501.
Preemption also raises delegation issues, as most states have been granted primacy in administering federal environmental laws. Audit statutes with broad immunity or privilege language may
abrogate state primacy, causing EPA to withdraw recognition of the state's administration program.
See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. Wyoming's statute arguably does not raise delegation
issues because penalty immunities are unavailable if they would violate federal law or rules or regulations regarding state primacy. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. See also Virginia Morton
Creighton, Comment, Colorado's Environmental Audit Privilege Statute: Striking The Appropriate
Balance?, 67 U. CoLO. L. REV. 443, 465-67 (1996).
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However, federal courts will recognize state privileges where state
decisional law provides the rule of decision.51 A federal district court
recognized the self-critical analysis privilege in Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc.,56 a medical malpractice action. 7 In Bredice, the court refused
to order discovery of documents relating to staff meetings held to review,
analyze and evaluate clinical work of staff members for the purpose of
continued improvements in care and treatment of patients. 58
On the other hand, the seventh circuit refused to recognize a state
privilege in a federal antitrust suit brought by a private litigant against an
Illinois hospital.59 The court distinguished Bredice because it was a malpractice action whereas an action under federal antitrust law implicated a
strong public interest in favor of private enforcement actions .'
Environmental audit privileges protect regulated entities in the same
way as the self-critical analysis privilege discussed by the courts in
Bredice and Memorial Hospital protects hospitals. Thus, it is likely that
federal courts hearing a tort or other state law cause of action which
provides a state rule of decision will find the regulated entity's privilege

55.

FED. R. EVED. 501. "However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-

ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law." /d.
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary concluded that this proviso was to
ensure that State privilege law applied in civil actions governed by the Erie doctrine. "The rationale
underlying the proviso is that federal law should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas
such as privilege absent a compelling reason." HousE CoMM. OF JUDICIARY, FED. RULES OF EVID.,
H.R. REP. NO. 650, at 8 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082.
56. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970). The self-critical analysis privilege was first identified in the
Bredice case where the court concluded that the public interest dictated that certain types of information remain confidential so that the flow of ideas and advice "can continue unimpeded." Id. at 251.
The self-critical analysis privilege is widely believed to be the common law privilege that forms the
basis of a number of state audit statutory privileges. See generally David Sorenson, Comment, Auditing Policy and Potential Conflict with State-Created Environmental Audit Privilege Laws, 9 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 483 (1996).
Commentators have examined two other privileges that might protect audits. See Kirk F.
Marty, Note, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance:Legislative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REV. 495 (1995) (discussing the work product
privilege and the attorney client privilege); John Davidson, Privilegesfor Environmental Audits: Is
Mum Really the Word?, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 111 (1995). The focus of this comment is Wyoming
practitioners' use of the audit statute; common law privileges will not be discussed in detail as they
are not provided for in the statute.
57. Id.
58. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250. Compare with Harston v. Campbell County Mem'l Hosp., 913
P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1996) (deciding that the district court improperly denied discovery of certain hospital
records without an in camera review to determine if the statutory privilege extends to plaintiff's incident reports and materials relating to the appointment and review of her physician).
59. Memorial Hosp. for McHeny County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 1062.
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survives. However, if the entity is sued under federal law, the court is
likely to find that the public interest in private enforcement actions outweighs the state privilege."
An entity in federal court under both federal and state law causes of
action may find that the state privilege survives. Again, no federal court
has considered this question with regard to an audit privilege statute or
any other state privilege statute. However, a Florida district court applied
Florida's common law self-critical analysis privilege in a CERCLA and
state law action for cost recovery. 6 The court compared the self-critical
analysis privilege to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures.63 It adopted the common law privilege under the authority of Rule 501 which allows a court
to recognize a privilege when it "promotes sufficiently important interests
to outweigh the need for probative evidence.",
Finally, federal courts have not recognized state evidentiary privileges when an enforcement action is brought by the federal government.'
The Dexter court discussed the self-critical analysis privilege in the context of the defendant's motion to prevent discovery of self-evaluative
documents.' Numerous courts have recognized the self-critical analysis
privilege, based on the proposition that "[tihe public interest may be a
reason for not permitting inquiry into particular matters of discovery. " 67
However, the court declined to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in Dexter because it would frustrate Congress' express declaration of
public policy in the Clean Water Act.'
Thus, a regulated entity asserting an evidentiary privilege under
Wyoming law to protect audit results is unlikely to succeed if sued in
federal court under federal question jurisdiction.69 Further, the evidentiary
audit privilege is nonexistent if the entity is sued in federal court by the
federal government. Finally, the survival of an evidentiary privilege in
suits in federal court under mixed questions of state and federal is uncer-

61.
62.

Id.
Reichold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).

63. Id. at 524.
64. Id. at 526 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
65. United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990).

66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, citing Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250-251).
68. Dexter, 132 F.R.D. at 9-10.
69. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 664 F.2d at 1063."As to the Hospital's claim that
this conflict between state and federal law [relating to privilege] places him [sic] 'on the horns of an
insoluble dilemma,' we view this dilemma as wholly illusory when considered in light of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution." Id.
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tain.7 At a minimum, attorneys should stress the inherent unreliability of
the statutory audit privilege.
E. State Delegated Authority
Explicit delegation issues arise in the context of many state audit
laws when the statute calls for blanket reduction or elimination of penalties for reported violations of federal environmental laws.71 Under most
federal environmental laws, states may undertake enforcement programs
with the approval of federal agencies; generally, state programs must
meet certain criteria laid out in the federal statute that the state seeks to
enforce. Thus, if an audit law provides blanket penalty immunities, it will
likely conflict with the enforcement purposes of the federal legislation the
state has been delegated to enforce.
If a state's environmental audit law is preempted because it
impermissibly conflicts with the purposes of a federal law, a state risks
losing its delegated authority. For example, the EPA recently rejected
proposals from Idaho, Michigan and Texas to administer the Acid Rain
provisions of the Clean Air Act. The EPA indicated that these states may
receive final approval of their permit programs upon modification of their
audit laws. 72

However, Wyoming's audit law contains a specific provision denying penalty immunities if extending the immunity would result in a state
program less stringent than the federal program or if penalty immunity
would itself be a violation of federal regulations required to maintain state

70. Textron, 157 F.R.D. at 526 (holding that the privilege survives). But see Memorial Hosp.,
664 F.2d at 1061 (holding that the privilege does not survive). See also Perrignon v. Bergen
Bnsnswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Robinson v. Magovem. 83 F.R.D. 79, 84 (W.D.
Pa. 1979). Courts that have rejected the privilege focused on the almost certain failure of plaintiffs
case without the requested information. Memorial Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1062 ('To deny Dr. Tambone
access to this information may very well prevent him from bringing his action altogether."). Id. at
1063.
71. Audit privileges raise implicit delegation issues because the privilege provisions are not in
direct conflict with a federal statute that the state must enforce. However, to the extent that statutory
privileges hamper a state's enforcement efforts, a federal agency may find that the state can no longer

uphold its federally delegated responsibilities. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing
the implications of Wyoming's audit privilege and concerns it might raise for the EPA).
72. Targeted Environmental Legislation Given Best Chance in Congress, (BNA) Jan. 24, 1997.

See also Clean Air Act Proposed Disapproval or in the Alternative, Proposed Interim Approval of
Operating Permits Program; State of Idaho, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,990, 55,000 (1995).
EPA's suggestion that Idaho could receive interim approval to operate its Title V program
by agreeing to modify its audit statute by removing the statutory blanket immunity provisions may be
mooted by the fact that Idaho's audit law expires in 1997. However, neither Michigan nor Texas has
indicated any intention of bringing their audit laws into line with EPA requirements. Targeted Environmental Legislation Given Best Chance In Congress, supra.
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primacy.' This delegation savings provision was added to the law to
ensure that Wyoming would not, through operation of its audit law, run
afoul of its federally delegated responsibilities. For instance, an entity
seeking a penalty immunity for a Clean Air Act violation discovered
during an audit will not receive the immunity if the Clean Air Act mandates certain penalties. Thus, as a purely legal matter, the Wyoming law
will likely survive EPA scrutiny. 74 However, the savings provision creates
uncertainty for the regulated community because the particular violation
which might trigger the savings provision in a specific case cannot be
known until application is made for the immunity.
EPA's Approach To EnvironmentalAudits
Despite Wyoming's attempts to create an audit statute which will not
raise delegation issues directly, other portions of the Wyoming statute
may cause the EPA to question the state's ability to satisfy its federally
delegated responsibilities. For instance, the privilege provisions raise
hurdles for the state in pursuing a criminal enforcement action.75 The
EPA has stated that it will carefully scrutinize any statute that does not
appear to guarantee basic protections to public health and the environment.76 As the EPA has the power to reassert primacy for enforcement of
federal environmental laws, a practitioner should consider how the EPA's
audit policy differs from the Wyoming law.
The EPA first issued an environmental auditing policy statement in
July of 1986, encouraging industry to use audits as a means to greater
environmental compliance." The agency regards environmental audits as
a means of establishing cooperation between the regulated community and
federal enforcement efforts, which can result in greater compliance with
federal environmental laws.7" The EPA recognized that any official policy

73. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. States such as Texas and Colorado extend blan-

ket civil and criminal immunity from penalties for reported violations. In states such as these, the
EPA may withdraw its approval of the state program to administer federal environmental laws. This
would drastically change the enforcement environment in a state. See Creighton, supra note 54, at
466-69.
74. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the statute requires that
any records, reports or other information required by federal law be turned over to DEQ and cannot
be protected by the audit privilege.
76. Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,710.
77. Auditing Policy, supra note 2, at 25,004.
78. Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,707. See also Auditing Policy, supra note 2, at 25,006
('Auditing can result in improved facility environmental performance, help communicate effective
solutions to common environmental problems.... and generate protocols and checklists which help
facilities better manage themselves.").
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to request audits could be a disincentive to industry to conduct audits. 9
However, EPA acknowledged that it would continue to address enforcement efforts at facilities with poor environmental records and might request audits in the course of enforcement proceedings.' The EPA also encouraged states to adopt auditing policies but to be mindful of state responsibilities under federal statutes.81
The EPA's 1986 policy was widely viewed as creating few incentives for industry to engage in audits.' The EPA promised to continue to
request audits in its enforcement actions; however, the agency also promised to continue to direct its inspections toward those facilities with poor
environmental records.' In addition, while the EPA encouraged states in
their programs to consider case-by-case reductions in civil fines if a company has self-reported, it created no across-the-board reductions in fines.'
Due to criticisms of the 1986 policy, the EPA began a reevaluation process of its audit policy in 1994. The first document it released was an
interim audit policy that announced proposed changes in its penalty and
enforcement provisions to provide audit incentives to industry."
To be eligible for these incentives, companies must comply with a
number of conditions. A company must engage in self-policing and voluntarily disclose and correct violations promptly.' Violations posing an
imminent and substantial endangerment must be expediently remedied;
companies must also seek to avoid repeat violations.' Companies must
demonstrate that they have taken appropriate precautions to avoid violations.' Finally, companies should cooperate with the EPA to the extent
necessary for the EPA to determine whether its policy may be applied.'
In most cases, companies meeting these conditions could receive a seventy-five percent reduction in gravity based penalties."

79. Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,707.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Sorenson, supra note 56, at 483, Robert Damel, Note, Environmental CriminalEnforcement and Corporate EnvironmentalAuditing: Time for a Compromise?, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123
(1993). But see Linda Richenderfer & Neil R. Bigioni, Going Naked Into the Thorns: Consequences
of Conducting an Environmental Audit Program, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (1992) (concluding that

some benefits accrue to companies undertaking environmental audits).
83. Auditing Policy, supra note 2, at 25,007.
84. Id. at 25,008.
85. Restatement, supra note 49, at 38,455.
86. Interim Policy, supra note 2, at 16,875.
87. Id. at 16,877.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91.

Id."Gravity based penalties" are defined by EPA as "that portion of the penalty over and

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1997

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 32 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 24
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXII

The Interim Policy announced the EPA's strong objection to state created audit privileges and promised greater scrutiny of states with privilege or
penalty immunity laws.' The EPA's concern with state privilege laws was the
potential for vastly different penalties under federal law depending on a
company's location. 95 However, the EPA recognized the importance of states
as "partners in federal enforcement" and indicated that it would notify states
of any provisions of their audit statutes that concerned the EPA.'
This Final Policy extends many of the same incentives to industry as
were offered in the Interim Policy.' However, the regulated community
has additional incentive in EPA's elimination of all gravity based penalties
contingent upon nine conditions." If companies do not meet all nine
conditions, they are still eligible for a 75 percent reduction in 97penalties,
as set out in the Interim Policy and extended in the final policy.
In addition to audit incentives that eliminate or minimize civil fines,
companies meeting the nine conditions to avoid civil penalties will also
not be recommended by the EPA for criminal charges. 9 The EPA will
also continue the policy of not requesting audits to initiate enforcement
investigations. However, if the EPA learns independently of the violation,
it may request the audit. 9
Thus, while the EPA has signaled its approval of state penalty reduction and immunity provisions, significant differences remain between the
EPA guidelines and the Wyoming audit law. First, the EPA will not
recognize a state audit privilege.' t" An attorney cannot stress enough the

above the economic benefit, i.e., the punitive portion... rather than that representing a defendant's
economic gain from non-compliance." Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,711.
92. Interim Policy, supra note 2, at 16,878.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also infra note 105.
95. See Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,707.
96. Those conditions are: (1) the violation must have been discovered during an environmental
audit; (2) the company must have discovered the problem voluntarily, and not as a result of any legal
assessment requirements; (3) the company must disclose the violation within ten days; (4) the company must discover and disclose the violation prior to institution of agency action or citizen suit; (5) the
company must rectify the violation within 60 days or notify EPA in writing if correction will take
longer than 60 days; (6) the company must agree in writing to prevent a recurrence of the violation;
(7) the company must not have any similar violation on its record within the last three years; (8) the
violation must not have resulted in serious harm or imminent and substantial endangerment or have
violated the terms of any judicial consent agreement or court order; (9) the company must cooperate
with EPA in providing access to its information and employees. Id. at 66,711-66,712.
97. Id. at66,711.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. This policy has been explicit since 1994. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 38,457; Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,710.
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uncertainty that attaches to the state audit privilege in the context of federal authority. 01' Second, the EPA will not recommend a criminal prosecution if a company fully discloses a violation and acts expediently to clean
it up. Under the Wyoming law, reporting the violation to be eligible for

the immunity eliminates the privilege-the two are mutually exclusive-although the statute does not expressly exempt a party from criminal prosecution if the violation is reported. However, implicit in the
EPA's criminal prosecution policy is a rejection of the Wyoming provision allowing the entity time to assert the privilege and have a court
conduct an in camera review."R2
Last, the EPA will assess a 75 percent reduction in penalties for
violations reported outside of the context of an environmental audit. In
this respect the EPA's policy is broader than the Wyoming statute because
the only statutory means to penalty immunity is through reporting the
violation discovered through an audit.l°3 In addition, the EPA will continue to impose economic penalties, even if it grants the penalty reduction or
immunity. " This contrasts with the state law, which does not impose
economic penalties.,t 5

101. See supra notes 65-99 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.

104. "Economic penalties" are the amount of economic benefit conferred on an entity for noncompliance with an environmental law. Incentives, supra note 49, at 66,712.
105. EPA has begun no official review of Wyoming's audit statute to determine whether any of
the environmental programs delegated to the state should be revoked. Chris Tollefson, EPA Denies
Lagging in ProtectionProgramTransfer, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Mar. 11, 1997 at A1; Chris Tollefson,
No Violations Withheld From Public. Law's Proponets Say, CASPER STAR-TRiB., Mar. 19, 1997 at
Al. However, the EPA released a policy statement to ensure that state audit laws are reviewed in a
consistent manner. The EPA signalled approval of state audit laws that: allow the state (1) to obtain
complete and immediate injunctive relief, (2) to recover various civil penalties, (3) to obtain criminal
sanction and fines for willful and knowing violations of federal law, (4) to retain information gathering authority as required under federal law, (5) to make evidentiary privileges inapplicable in criminal
proceedings, and (6) to preserve the right of the public to obtain information about noncompliance,
report violations and the like. EPA Issues Multimedia Policy to Oversee Review of State Audit Laws,
INSIDE EPA, Feb. 21, 1997, at 6. The EPA stated that it will resolve ambiguities in state laws by consuiting state attorneys general for opinion letters.
Wyoming's statute provides most of these safeguards but may suffer from ambiguity. See
supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text. For instance, the evidentiary privilege is not presumptive
in criminal prosecutions, but the entity may assert the privilege by application to the court within 20

days of the suit. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. However, the law provides for court
ordered disclosure of material that shows evidence of noncompliance with any federal environmental
law. WYO. STAT. 35-11-1105(c)(iii) (referring to WYO. STAT. 35-11-1105(c)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1996)
("The material shows evidence of noncompliance with this act or any federal environmental
law . . ").
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Recommendations
Environmental audit provisions have the potential to greatly assist
agencies in their monitoring and enforcement of environmental compliance. Because few regulated entities seem to be taking advantage of
Wyoming's audit statute, the audit provisions might be modified either
through legislative action or DEQ rulemaking to make the provisions
more attractive to the business community."'° The legislature or the DEQ
could look at several options for modifying the current provisions.
One option is to generally reconsider the privilege provision. The
EPA cites a Price-Waterhouse study that found industry looked for immunity from penalty-type incentives in deciding whether to conduct audits ."°
Availability of an audit privilege was not an element in the entity's decision to conduct audits." The legislature might consider removing the
privilege portion of the audit provisions entirely. South Dakota took this
approach in passing its environmental audit provisions.
The South Dakota audit statute creates no privilege for audit documents." Regulated entities are only eligible for civil and criminal penalty
immunity if violations discovered during an audit are reported to South
Dakota's Department of Environmental Quality."0 The statute expressly
makes audit documents subject to discovery."' In addition, the audit may
not be used as a defense to a civil or criminal action under certain conditions: willful violation of state or federal environmental laws; a pattern of
repeated environmental violations; failure to correct within sixty days of
discovery of a violation; or assessment of a civil penalty following notice
of violation within two years of the date of disclosure."' The advantage to
South Dakota's approach is that it eliminates any uncertainty concerning
an audit's confidentiality.
However, simply better defining Wyoming's environmental audit
privilege provision is probably more beneficial to regulated entities. Such
action would also remove much of the uncertainty regarding the confidentiality of the audit."1 3 In addition, it would not necessarily impede either
106. Alternatively, the regulated community may be showing little interest because the law was
enacted less than two years ago.
107. Incentives, supra note, 49 at 66,707.
108. Id. at 66,710.
109. S.D. CODffF*D LAWS §§ 1-40-33 to -37 (Michie 1996).
110. Id. 1-40-34.
111. Id. § 1-40-35.
112. Id. § 1-40-36.
113. However, the regulated community should still be wary of the extent of a state evidentiary
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the DEQ's enforcement mission or civil litigants pursuing state or federal
causes of action. As Wyoming's law is presently written, an entity can
perform an audit and receive the protection of an evidentiary privilege in
civil actions, subject to in camera review by a court or hearing officer." 4
This gives unwary defendants the sense that their audit may be more wellprotected than it is.
In addition to the possibility of a federal court simply refusing to
recognize the state privilege," 5 the in camera review process is treacherous. The questions to be asked at an in camera review are fact based and
can be highly technical. Presumably, a court could render a reasonable
decision on the issue of fraudulent assertion of the privilege." 6 However,
determining which material is properly "in" the audit documents and thus
subject to the privilege may be difficult as the information is likely to be
highly technical. 7 In addition, assessing whether the audit results demonstrate a serious threat to public health or the environment can also be a
highly technical question." 8
Some of the uncertainty regarding the outcome of an in camera
review could be eliminated if the courts and the DEQ developed a list of
well-respected experts in such fields as hydrology and hazardous waste.
Courts or administrative hearing officers could draw from this list to
appoint Special Masters who could review the evidence and render a
decision about whether the audit meets the conditions which would force
disclosure. "9
Alternatively, the courts might defer to the DEQ in making in camera determinations about audit documents. While this would create a
greater risk of bias than appointing a Special Master (presumably one
from out-of-state, to avoid the appearance of an insider reviewing industries' audits), it would free the courts from making decisions about highly
technical information. The DEQ might appoint someone from within.the
agency with special expertise to determine whether the privilege should
apply. The DEQ could accomplish either of these alternatives to in camera review of audits through a rulemaking.
privilege. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
114. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (Michie Supp. 1996). Note that § 35-11-1105(c)(iii)(ix) establishes a different procedure for criminal prosecutions, which requires an affirmative act to
assert the privilege on the part of the entity following disclosure of the audit with probable cause. See
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text,
115. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
116. Id. § 35-11-1105(c)(ii)(A).
117. Id. § 35-11-1105(c)(ii)(B).
118. Id. § 35-11-1105(c)(iii)(D).
119. Id. § 35-11-1105(c).
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In addition to injecting greater certainty into the in camera review
process, the legislature might consider modifying the statutory language to
eliminate certain types of situations from privilege, without reference to in
camera review. The legislature might study the patterns emerging in the
case law regarding state statutory and common law privileges that resemble audit privileges. 1" For instance, following United States v. Dexter,'
the legislature might exclude from the privilege enforcement actions taken
by the federal government.
The legislature might also consider making the audits discoverable
but excluding them from admissibility in court."t The Wyoming statute
currently creates an evidentiary privilege but no presumption of
discoverability. An explicit provision allowing discovery would eliminate
uncertainty and legal maneuvering by both plaintiffs and defendants. l
Finally, another simple approach the legislature might consider is an
"opt in" type approach, where the regulated entity notifies the DEQ of its
intention to conduct an audit." This fosters good communication between
the regulated community and the DEQ. Further, it is beneficial to the
DEQ because the agency can then direct its inspection and enforcement
efforts elsewhere.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming's environmental audit provisions provide incentives to
businesses to proactively manage their facilities for environmental compliance. As yet, these audit provisions are untested, but likely will see more
use as the business community becomes more aware of the law and how it
might benefit businesses. To make the law more attractive to the business
community, the legislature and the DEQ should consider minor changes.
Practitioners should familiarize themselves with the law, keeping
their client's unique situations in mind, since the law applies differently
depending on a facility's environmental compliance history. Because no
case law exists concerning the viability of environmental audit privileges,
practitioners should be somewhat wary when advising their clients. Ac-

120.
121.
122.
123.
discovery
124.

See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990). See also supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3333 (1996).
Note that Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1101 (Michie Supp. 1996) already expressly allows
of documents related to the audit by third parties.
An example is TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 10(g) (1995) (requiring a facil-

ity to give notice to the appropriate agency before conducting its environmental audit in order to
qualify for the immunity provision).
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cordingly, practitioners should inform interested clients not only of the
state audit law, but also federal environmental audit policy.
RYAN

H. CHILDS

SARAH KLAHN
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